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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
BUEHNER BLOCK COMPANY, a 
corp., and SOUTH STATE BUILD-
ERS SUPPLY COMPANY, a corp., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
NICK GLEZOS, HARRY HONG, Case No. 8591 
CHARLES C. McDERMOND, COP A 
SUPPER CLUB, a corp., and 
VALLEY AMUSEMENT ENTER-
PRISES, INCORPORATED, a corp., 
Defendants and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
HARRY HONG 
PARTIES OF INTEREST 
1. Buehner Block Company, a corporation, respond-
ent and plaintiff. Furnished building blocks and materials 
of a value of $695.51 for property located at 3793 South 
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, generally known as, 
and hereafter referred to as the "Golden Pheasant" or 
the "Copa Supper Club." 
2. South State Builders Supply Company, a corpo-
ration, respondent and plaintiff. Furnished building ma-
terials of a value of $395.84 for said property. 
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3. Nick Glezos, named defendant. Ovv-rner in fee of 
said property ·upon which building material was used 
(R. 46). 
4. Harry Hong, appellant and named defendant. 
A Chinaman and leaseholder of said property owned by 
Nick Glezos (R. 46, 47, 49, Lease Agreement Exhibit 5). 
5. C. C. McDermond, named defendant, ajkja 
Charles L. McDermond, and Chase ~IcDermond. Sub-
tenant of Harry Hong (R. 47, 63, 64, 65, 69), building con-
tractor who ordered and received material from plaintiff 
and respondent, Buehner Block Co. (R. 47, Notice of 
Lien, Exhibit 2; R. 48, Order and Delivery Slips, Ex-
hibit 1), a charter member of named defendant Copa 
Supper Club; president and director of named defendant 
Valley Amusen1ent Enterprises Incorporated (R. 8); 
prospective purchaser of lease and fixtures from Harry 
Hong (R. 50, 56, 59, 60, 66, 68, 71). Judgment entered 
against by default (R. 14). 
6. "Copa Supper Club," a corporation, named de-
fendant. Formed and incorporated as a non profit cor-
poration on the 22nd day of January, 195±, at Salt Lake 
City, lTtah. Incorporators thereof being Joseph 
L. Sloan, Charles L. ill cDet·'lno n d, Morris Hayden~ Eileen 
Hayden, Lee T. Louie*, Ray Nebeker, :Jirs. Bo}Td Doug-
las, Wesley Cro,vther, 11 ar ry Lee*, To nz I'" ee:~, and 
J iJn'Jnic Flong*. The directors thereof "·ere as follows: 
Ray Nebeker, 1\frs. Boyd Douglas, '': esley Crowther, 
Ha1'TY Lee*, Tont Yee*. Judgn1ent entered against ~•copa 
Supper Club" by default (R. 14). 
7. Valley A1nusement Enterprises Incorporated, a 
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3 
corporation, named defendant. Formed and incorporated 
for pecuniary profit on the 18th day of November, 1954, 
at Salt Lake C~ity, Utah, and capitalized for $10,000.00 at 
$1.00 per share. Incorporators and officers being: 
Name Shares Officer 
Chase llf cDermond --------------------------------··---3 ,100 President 
H. T. Cope __________________________________________________ 2,500 V.-Pres. 
Spence Van N oy (see 8 below) ______________ 1 ,950 T~reasurer 
Ray E. Nebeker------------------------------------------ 500 Director 
R. Worthen Gibbs ____________________________________ 1,950 Secretary 
Article 22 of the Articles of Incorporation of the Valley 
Amusement Enterprises Incorporated reads as follows: 
"The amount of the capital stock of this Cor-
por.ation consists of a lease dated the 1st day of 
December, 1953, covering the property located at 
3793 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
generally known as the "Golden Pheasant," with 
the appurtenances and privileges thereunto be-
longing which the Corporation shall hereby and 
does purchase, take, receive .and hold and $6,900.00 
paid into said Corporation. 
"The fair estimated cash value of said lease 
is $3,100.00 and the said leasehold is taken, held, 
and received and purchased by the s.aid Corpora-
tion in full payment of and for the capital stock 
of 3,100 shares; and the respective owner of said 
·*Lee T. Louie, Harry Lee, Tom Yee and Jimmie Fong are China-
men. Two of these four Chinamen, Harry Lee and ·Tom Yee, 
are directors. 
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4 
leasehold above described has agreed with the In-
corporators and the corporation that upon and 
simultaneously with the issue of the chart~r here-
in that the said number of shares fully paid shall 
be delivered to the said holder and the said holder 
is to convey the lease upon the descr~bed property 
to the Corporation and that the Issue of such 
stock and the transfer of such leasehold shall con-
stitute full payment respectively." 
Judgment entered against by default (R. 14). 
8. Spencer VanNoy, not a defendant. Known also 
as Spence 'Tan N oy (see 7 above)~ building and general 
contractor who ordered, received and paid for materials 
from plaintiff and respondent, South State Builders 
Supply (R. 53, R. 48, Notice of Lien,- Exhibit 4; Order 
and Delivery Slips, Exhibit 3; R. 36 (3) Answer to Inter-
rogatory No. 1, f, h, and i, admitting payments received 
from and credit given to Spencer VanNoy for materials 
supplied for and on behalf of "Copa Supper Club"), also 
incorporator, treasurer and director of named defendant, 
Valley Amusen1ent Enterprises Incorporated. 
9. Willian1 0. ''T atson, not a party to this action, 
but a witness for the plaintiffs and respondents. Con-
tracted to do the blocl\. 'vork for approxin1atel~T five 
to six hundred dollars (R. 80). TF.itness, after a long 
1.ohile and much difficulty, got paid for u~ork, but one 
young fellow that u;as working for this 1citness, to this 
day has in the neighborhood of $150.00 coming that he 
didn't get because this 1citness felt Harry Jlong quit 
paying the labor b·ills (R. 81, 89). Hired by and contract 
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5 
of employment and agreement was with l\!lcDermond 
(R. 83, 84). 
10. Donald L. Buehner, credit and office manager 
for plaintiff and respondent, Buehner Block Co. First 
talked to appellant and defendant Harry Hong during 
the construction of the back part (R. 84); admitted block 
was first ordered cjo the Golden Pheasant, that they 
inve.stigated the order and found that owner Glezos 
knew nothing of order so went to premises and talked 
to McDennond and was told that McDermond ordered the 
block and so changed the order so that contract was with 
McDermond and not cjo the "Golden Pheasant'' (R. 85, 
see also every order and delivery slip and specifically 
order and delivery slip #28297 dated 7/14/54 charged to 
and signed by C. C. McDermond cjo Golden Pheasant, 
and the following slips #28326 and #28327 dated 7/15/54, 
plus subsequent delivery slips, charged to C. C. McDer-
mond, with no mention of c/o the Golden Pheasant there-
on.) Aforesaid order and delivery .slips are found be-
tween R. 39 and 40, and are referred to because it is 
noted that Exhibit 1 does not include one order and 
delivery slip, the first one #28297, dated 7/14/54, which 
makes mention of c;'o "Golden Pheasant" and which sup-
ports and bears out the witness' story and verifies the 
fact to be that plaintiff Buehner Block Co. had notice 
within 24 hours that they were dealing with McDermond 
on delivering the block, and did not rely at all upon the 
"Golden Pheasant," appellant Hong, or anyone else in 
supplying the block. 
11. Wayne R. Kinzer, not a party to this action. 
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Witness for plaintiffs, who did brickwork on premise.s 
and was paid therefor by witness William 0. Watson. 
Did some added work on the pre1nises that he hadn't been 
paid for at the time of trial (R. 91). 
STATE~IENT O:B, THE CASE 
Defendant and appellant Harry Hong, hereafter re-
ferred to as appellant Hong, a Chinaman, was leasing 
from Nick Glezos the premises located at 3793 South 
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, a restaurant and 
cafe generally known as the "Golden Pheasant," under a 
leased dated the 1st day of December, 1953, and marked 
as Exhibit 5 (R. 49, 61) and previously referred to in 
Article 22 of the Articles of Incorporation of the \Talley 
Amusement Enterprise Incorporated. This lease pro-
vided for payment of $250.00 per month rent, and pro-
vided that appellant Hong would not allow said premises 
to be used for any purpose that would incre3.;Se the rate of 
insurance thereon, and paragraph 6 provided that appel-
lant Hong would not assign the lease or sublet the said 
premises, or any part thereof, ,,-ithout the written con-
sent of named defendant Nick Glezos, l1ereafter referred 
to as owner Glezos. Prior to Deee1nber 1~ 1953, appellant 
Hong had bought the fixtures and business at a oost 
of $8,000.00 and installed other equipn1ent and re-
modeled so that the 'vhole thing cost around $36,000.00 
(R. 56). Prior to May or June of 1954, nan1ed defendant 
C. C. McDermond, hereafter referred to as promoter Mc-
Dermond, approached appellant Hong and wanted to buy 
him out, but wanted .a larger place. Appellant Hong at 
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this time introduced promoter McDermond to owner 
Glezos as the man who wanted to buy appellant Hong out 
(R. 70). Promoter McDermond .after talking with owner 
Glezos got permission from Glezos to build on the prem-
ises if he bought appellant Hong out and paid for every-
thing (R. 71). On the 14th day of July, 1954, promoter 
McDermond ordered and continued to order to the 6th 
day of August, 1954, all material from plaintiff and re-
spondent, Buehner Block Co. and Buehner Block Co. only 
(see first order and delivery slip #28297, found between 
R. 39 .and 40, also Exhibits 1 and 2). Promoter Mc-
Dermond ordered nothing from plaintiff respondent 
South State Builders Supply. 
About September 18, 1954, appellant Hong became 
sick .and closed the place (R. 55, 63), and at this time 
promoter McDermond was going to buy the place (R. 65). 
Appellant Hong reopened the cafe about April of 1955 
(R. 55, 59). During this time, promoter McDermond, or 
Dr. Richard Gibbs of the Copa Supper Club, paid appel-
lant Hong $250.00 a month rent (R. 63). 
Thereafter, beginning on the 23rd day of October, 
1954, the treasurer and director of the v ....alley Amusement 
Enterprise·s, Inc., also building contractor for the "Cop.a 
Supper Club," Spencer Van N oy, hereafter referred to 
as Copa Supper Club \Tan N oy, ~s a general contractor 
(Notice of Lien, Exhibit 4) and on behalf of the named 
defendant Copa Supper Club (see every order and de-
livery slips between R. 39 and 40, also Exhibit 3), did 
order and continue to order all material front plaintiff 
and respondent, South State Builders Supply from the 
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23rd day of October to the 5th day of November, 1954 
(Ex. 3 and 4). 
On the 18th day of November, 1954, the Valley 
Amusement Enterprises, Inc., was incorporated with 
promoter McDermond as president and Copa Supper 
Club Van Noy as treasurer, with the declaration in 
Article 22 thereof to the effect that promoter McDer-
mond, and McDermond solely, and not representing a 
partnership or anyone else, agreed to convey the lease 
to the premises to the said corporation, receiving all stock 
issued therefor to himself. (Note is made of the fact that 
promoter McDermond rece·ived 3,100 shares at par value 
of $3,100.00, and the declaration in Article 22 that the 
fair estimated cash value of said lease was $3,100.00.) 
On the 29th day of December, 1954, plaintiff Buehner 
Block Company did record materialmans lien for furnish-
ing n1aterials to C. C. l\fcDermond, who was the building 
contractor for owner Glezos, against owner Glezos only 
(Exhibit 2). 
On the 31st day of Decen1ber, 195-!, plaintiff South 
State Builders Supply did record materialmans lien for 
furnishing 1naterials to Spencer \Tan Noy, who was the 
building contractor for owner Glezos (Exhibit 4), who 
ordered said Inaterial for and in behalf of the c·opa Sup-
per Club. Said lien was docketted against owner Glezos 
only (Exhibit 3). 
On the 29th day of January, 1955, the Copa Supper 
Club w.as incorporated ~s a non profit corporation with 
promoter McDermond as a charter n1ember, along with 
four Chinamen, Lee T. Lottie, Harry Lee, Torn Yee and 
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Jimmie Fang. Said !larry Lee and Tom l'"'"ee being di-
rectors of said Copa Supper Club. (Nate is rnade that 
treasurer Van N oy was not a charter 1nember but was a 
contractor for said Copa Supper Club and ordered all 
materials furnished by plaintiff South State Builders 
Supply Company as ev·idenced by Exhibits 3 and 4). 
On the 13th day of June, 1955, plaintiff Buehner 
Block Co. did file a complaint -consisting of two cause.s of 
action against all named defendants (R. 1, 2, 3). Plaintiff 
South State Builders Supply, on the 3rd day of Novem-
ber, 1955, did file a similar complaint (R. 17, 18, 19). 
The allegations were alike, and as a result thereof party 
plaintiffs were joined (R. 20). 
The type of action involved here is best described by 
quoting the plaintiffs trial description thereof, as fol-
lows: 
"Now our action here has been commenced 
upon two theories. One, that we claim a lien upon 
the property for the material fut·nished and upon 
the leasehold interest because of the lessee, Mr. 
Hong, dealing and working with Mr. McDermond 
and the materialmen in procuring materials for 
the building there. 
TFIE COURT: Is McDermond the con-
tractor~ 
MR. CONDER: (Attorney for plaintiffs) 
McDern~ond is the subtenant with Mr. Hong, as I 
understand it, although I've never seen any con-
tract between the1n. McDermond is the one who 
ordered the material, I must admit that. So far 
as the direct contract is concerned we have no di-
rect contract with-1lfr. Hong, nor with Mr. Glezos. 
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We clairn an in~plied contract because of the be??'e-
fit to them, the knowledge they had an~ the illl-
plied consent and ll:nprovemen~s wh1c~ were 
placed on the property, the un.1ust enr-t?hment 
which they received to the property as be~ng the 
basic ca·use of action." (R. 47) 
In order to pass upon the errors which appellant 
claims were committed, it is deemed necessary to direct 
the attention of this court to the plaintiffs pleadings and 
the evidence offered and received at the trial, together 
with findings, and conclusions arrived therefrom. 
In plaintiffs first cause of action (the foreclosure of 
lien count), the only allegation contained in the entire 
cause of action is allegation 7, (Buehner R. 2, South State 
R. 18). 
Plaintiffs second cause of action (the unjust enrich-
ment count) the only allegations in the entire cause of 
action are 2 and 3, 'vhich are identical in both plaintiffs 
complaint, except as to amount and are as follows: 
2. "All of the defendants herein clairn some 
interest in the property described in Paragraph 
4 of plaintiff's first cause of action, either by way 
of ownership or lease hold estate_ and the exact 
nature of the interest of each defendant is un-
known to this plaintiff. 
3. The plaintiff herein furnished building 
materials for· the benefit of defendants, or each of 
them, and plaintiff should be reimbursed for the 
reasonable value of the Inaterial so furnished 
which plaintiffs allege to be $695.51 and $395.84.'; 
(R. 2, 3, 18) 
Appellant Hong filed a n1otion to dis1niss because 
plaintiffs complaint failed to state a clann against appel-
lant upon which relief could be granted (R. 6). This mo-
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tion was denied and appellant Hong subsequently an-
swered the plaintiffs complaints by a general denial (R. 
15, 16, 22, 23). 
Default judgments were taken against named de-
fendants Charles C. McDermond, Copa Supper Club and 
V.alley Amusement Enterprises, Inc., with no findings 
of fact or conclusions of law being filed in support there-
of (R. 13, 14). 
Written interrogatories were submitted to plaintiffs 
by owner Glezos and in answer thereto plaintiff Buehner 
Block Company answered that no payments were made 
by anyone on the material supplied (R. 38), and that the 
following named were every person whom they proposed 
to offe!r or call as a witness: Don Buehner, William Wat-
son, and others not called on to testify (R. 40). (Witness 
Kinzer was not named or disclosed.) 
To the same interrogatories, South State Builders 
Supply answered that Spencer \Tan Noy (Copa Supper 
Club VanNoy) did make two pay"Tilents for rnaterial.s sup-
plied, and received credit for sandpaper returned 
(R. 36), and that following named were every person 
whom they proposed t<;> offer or call as a witnes.s : Nick 
Glezos, Spencer Van N oy, and others not called on to 
testify (R. 37). (Witness I{inzer was not named or dis-
closed.) 
The first witness called by the plaintiffs was ,appel-
lant Hong, who ~s an adverse witness testified as follows: 
That he leased from owner Glezos as per lease received 
in evidence and marked Exhibit 5 (R. 49). He was asked 
if '•Subsequently they built the room in back. Do you 
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12 
remember that~" He answered "Yes." (R. 49) He was 
asked "When did they commence that building in the 
back, do you know f' He answered he didn't know exactly. 
He testified that promoter ~IcDermond wanted to buy his 
place but wanted a bigger place. He told promoter Mc-
Dermond that he could not allow anyone to build on the 
premises without the landlord's consent. That a week or 
two later at promoter lvicDermond's insistence, he did 
introduce him to owner Glezos. At the introduction, he 
stayed a few minutes and then never returned. That 
at the time he heard owner Glezos ask promoter ~Ic­
Dermond if the room wasn't big enough for him, to which 
promoter McDermond replied that he wanted a private 
club for the purpose of putting a floor show and every-
thing in the same, and that he, promoter McDermond, 
was going to pay for everything. That upon McDermond 
promising to pay for everything, owner Glezos said it 
was all right for him to go ahead and build on the prem-
ises (R. 50). 
After this testilnony he " .. as asked ~'After that did 
they start to work on the back there f' He answered 
"Yes." (R. 51) That until approximately September 
of 1955, he was paying $250.00 a 1uonth rent, but at the 
thne of trial 'vas paying only $125.00 per n1onth rent and 
was utilizing about half the space (R. 51). That he did 
not give promoter l\IcDern1ond permission to tear the 
place up, and told him not to do so until he paid for ""hat 
he had put in (R. 52). He adn~itted that he knew Mr. 
V ~n N ~y b1,~;t denied ~hat h..e had evet" had any agreement 
w~th h~~m about putt~ng the building up and that he had 
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no agreement with anybody concerning putting the build-
ing up. That he ordered none of the materials that went 
into the building and saw none of the materials delivered 
to the job ( R. 53). He denied telling anyone to build or 
to change any part of the building. That he knew nothing 
about what the Copa Supper Club d!d or whether or not 
it was a corporation. That he knew nothing about the 
Valley Amuse1nent Enterpri.ses or anything about the 
clubs (R. 54). 
Then to direct questions asked, he answered that he 
never owned any stock in, or was never a 1ne1nber of the 
Copa Supper Club or the Valley Amusernent Enterprises, 
Inc. In .answer to the following question, "Were you there 
when they were building the room," he answered "Yes." 
That he was there part of the time, but becan1e sick on or 
about the 18th day of September, 1954, and that there-
after he had closed his cafe. That promoter McDermond 
and those fellows were going to buy his place, the back 
part of the roo1n. The Copa Supper Club or Valley 
Amusement Enterprises, Inc., didn't pay .so they gave 
me back the front part and he opened the san1e in April 
of 1955 (R. 55). That they had agreed to p~ay him what 
he had put into the premises, including his initial cost 
of buying the place, his fixtures and improve1nents since 
first occupation (R. 56). He denied ever introducing pro-
moter l\fcDermond to owner Glezos as his partner. That 
he didn't know Mr. Watson. He denied having eve-r paid 
out any checks whatsoever to anyone on the work, for 
either material or labor. That he did not know and had 
never seen a Harry Lee (R. 58). That he did not know a 
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Tom Yee but did know a Jimmie Fong. That Jimmie 
' Fong did work for him a couple of months when he re-
opened his cafe in April of 1955, but he didn't know 
whether or not Jimmie Fong had anything to do with the 
back part of the building and that he had no connection 
with him in the event he did so. He specifically denied 
having ever told owner Glezos that he was going to take 
promoter McDermond a.s a partner with him in his busi-
ness. That promoter ~IcDermond tried to get in but that 
he told hi1n that he to had to have some money to buy the 
share before he got in, and that he never received any 
money so couldn't put him in. That he never gave pro-
moter McDermond permission to build on the back. 
On cross examination, appellant Hong testified that 
he never saw anyone deliver any of the material, had 
never been sent a statement or invoice by either one of 
the plaintiffs, and never signed for any of the materials. 
That he had an agreen1ent to lease the premises to pro-
moter l\lcDer1nond and also to selling hlln fixtures. That 
the reason said agree1nent did not go through was be-
cause promoter l\IcDern1ond ne¥er paid him anything 
( R. 60). That he didn ,t recall after the building was built, 
anyone fron1 South State Builders Supply or Buehner 
Block coming and discussing any kind of payment for 
the building with hin1 or asking hi1n ''ho was going to 
pay for it (R. 61, see also testinzony of u:itness Buehner 
R. 85 verifying that appellant nzight not have recog-nized 
plainti If Buehner as a creditor). 
Upon further cross exa1nination, he testified that he 
didn't know at first "'"ho ran the back part because he 
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was sick at that time, September of 1954. That he re-
ceived $250.00 rent for the back part from promoter Mc-
Dermond and upon receiving the $250.00 per month rent 
from promoter McDermond or Dr. Richard Gibbs, he 
paid the same over to owner Glezo.s (R. 63). Th.at he 
continued to receive payment in the amount of $250.00 
from the people in the back until August of 1955 (R. 64). 
Upon recross examination, he testified that pending 
promoter McDermond keeping his promise to take the 
whole thing, he leased the premises for the amount of 
rent he was obligated to pay himself. That promoter 
McDermond paid him nothing in advance for this lease, 
and that he paid him by personal check, except for 
some being signed by Dr. Gibbs or a Mary Gibbs. That 
he didn't remember for sure having received a check 
from the Copa Supper Club and that he did have an 
agreement with promoter McDermond to purchase the 
fixtures and take the lease over. That he never advised 
promoter McDermond to go ahead and build a building 
on the premises (R. 69). 
Next witness called was Mr. Nick Glezos, one of 
the defendant, called as an adverse witness for the plain-
tiff. He testified that he was the owner of said premises. 
He was asked "Do you recall that H.arry Hong came 
to you and told you they wanted to build a back roon1 
on there~'' He answered "Yes." That it wa.s sometime in 
May or June that Harry Hong told him that he had 
a man that seemed to have a lot of money that wanted 
to build a big place for his own benefit. That Harry s.aid 
that he wasn't making any money there and that he might 
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have a chance to sell it. That he could not build a bigger 
place but he wanted to see ''that man." That subsequently, 
Harry Hong brought him out one- Sunday afte-rnoon and 
introduced promoter McDerrnond to him (R. 70). He 
was asked the question "Did he introduce Mr. McDer-
mond to you as his partner?" (R. 70). Answer "No, he 
is the man he like.s to buy the place if you will fix it 
just the way he wanted it." (R. 71) That he gave pro-
n1oter McDermond permission to build on the place if 
he was going to buy Harry Hong out, and upon the con-
dition that promoter McDermond would pay for every-
thing. Promoter McDermond told lrim that he would 
and that he had lots of money. He recalled having given 
a deposition on the lOth day of April, 1956, and that 
in answer to "Now, will you tell me what was said by 
you and Harry Hong~'' he answered, "\\Tell, he just 
asked if it would be all right to build another room there 
because his business not so good. He had a partner to 
come in with him.~' In answer to this~ O'IL'ner Glezos 
testified under oath at the trial~ ,.Well. I nz i.sund erstood 
you. You know what I 1nean. He says he was going to 
go in and buy the place. You know Harry's place, and 
the place he 'Yanted "~asn't big enough for his crowd he 
was going to bring in there and I just objected, you 
know. Finally, you know, he says, 'Nick, you don't have 
to spend nothing,' he says." Again referring to the de-
position taken on the lOth day of April, 1956, the question 
was asked, "McDern1ond and Harry Hong together~" 
answer ''Yes. l\fcDern1ond was supposed to put up the 
money." Question unid I 1tnderstand you to say that h.e 
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was partners with McDermond?" Answer "No. He was 
going to take him in as a partner." Then it was asked, 
"That was your answer at that time~" Answer "Well, 
maybe he was. Maybe I didn't understand it quite enough. 
You know what I mean. I seen them together there and 
Harry had the lease on it and I can do nothing else, you 
know what I mean." Question "But those were the ques-
tions and answers you gave at your deposition~" Answer 
"Yes, I think so." (R. 72) That after the building was 
put up, he received the sum of $125.00 from appellant 
Hong as rent and received from one Mr. Kopps the 
sum of $250.00 as rent for the rear portion of the build-
ing. He testified that they tore down one of the rear 
walls without his permission, and he didn't know they 
were going to make an entrance through the back room. 
That they told him they weren't going to do it, but they 
did tear down twenty-five feet and they made one roo1n 
out of it and they made Mr. Hong's place small so he 
couldn't use it for a restaurant. That is why he close up. 
He denied telling the1n that they could go .ahead and 
build a room back there, and told them he was going 
to sue them but they did it anyway. That up to November, 
1955, Harry Hong paid $250.00 a month rent, but since 
had paid the amount of $125.00. That since said month 
of November, 1955, he received the sum of $250.00 as 
rental for the back portion. That he told them, whoever 
it was, Dr. Gibbs, that they would have to pay him the 
tax difference and the insurance rate, and he said "I 
will." ( R. 7 4). The rear room added on is presently 
leased to a Mr. Kopps, who says that he bought the place 
from a Dr. Gibbs. 
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Up·on cross examination, owner Glezos testified that 
the-re have been a lot of changes in the operators of 
the back portion (R. 76). That when it was originally 
rented to Mr. Hong it had a private room for private 
parties, and that this had been destroyed by the building 
onto the premises. 
In redirect examination, the question was asked, 
"I would like to know from either Mr. Hong or 1Ir. 
Glezos if either of them obtained a building permit 
for this part." Mr. Glezos answered that he had not, 
and Mr. I-Iong answered that he had not (R. 78). Owner 
Glezos admitted that he was presently getting $375.00 
now as rent for the said premises when he was getting 
$250.00 before. The question was asked, "Did you know 
from Mr. McDermond what kind of a room he was going 
to build back there before he started!" And to this 
Owner Glezos answered "No. Ko, I didn't." (R. 78) 
Plaintiffs then called William 0. Watson, who testi-
fied under oath that he did the brick masonry work 
during the sun1n1er of 1954, on said premises. That he 
had h.ad conversation "~ith the defendant Hong probably 
half a dozen different times. That he could not testify 
to one person \vho Yras present 'vhen he had an~~ of these 
conversations inasmuch as each and ey·ery conversation 
was with him alone. He testified that Harry Hong and 
one other of his cottntrynzen upto''~ had an agreement 
with McDermond and three other partners. That Harry 
Hong and, he believed Harry Lee, agreed tJ1at the other 
four partners were to pay .all the labor that ,Yent into 
the building, and in return the other four partners were 
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supposed to have paid material bills on the construction 
(R. 80). 
At this time, it should be noted that one Harry Lee 
and Tom Y ee were named directors in the Copa Supper 
Club, and that appellant Hong was not even a member. 
Also that the court admonished the witness to tell just 
what Harry Hong said in conversations to him, not 
what he understood, for the reason that the court would 
make the understanding from wh.at was told to him, and 
to what he said Harry Hong said to him (R. 80). N-ot-
withstanding and disregarding this admonition, the wit-
ness went on to immediately testify "and after about two 
or three weeks, Harry Hong and his partner evidently 
backed out of the de;al and it threw McDermond. McDer-
mond told me that it threw everything up in the air 
because these two fellows had backed out and they 
couldn't go ahead and make their payments on the build-
ing as a result. After a long while I got my money, but 
I had one young fellow that was working for me .at the 
time "\vhen I got through with the block work McDermond 
wanted to borrow him for a couple of weeks to help 
the carpenters and various other things ; pouring the 
cement, and to this day he has still got in the neighbor-
hood of $150.00 coming that he didn't get because Harry 
Hong and his partner quit paying the lab-or bills .and on 
top of that Harry Hong had told me the:re was six of 
them originally agreed to go in on that deal." (R. 81). 
On cro.ss examination the court .asked the question 
"Well, I understand he got paid but Buehner Block and 
South State didn't. Do I understand, Mr. Watson you 
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to say that 1\tir. Hong told you that he and Lee w~re 
going to pay for the labor, but the other four were going 
to pay for the building materials~'' Answer "That's 
correct." Question by the court, "And that all six of 
them were partners~" Answer "Yes." "\Vitness was then 
asked when, where he was when Mr. Hong told him this 
and he said, "Oh! on the southwest corner of the building, 
outside." To the question of what time of day it was, he 
could only venture to say that it was around sometime 
in the morning between nine and twelve o'clock, and that 
he could not make it any more definite than that (R. 82). 
He admitted appellant Hong hadn't hired or retained him 
and that McDermond had hired him for the work. He 
said that he was told by Mr. McDermDnd that he had built 
at least ten different night clubs throughout the Rocky 
Mountain Area and that the six of thent were extending 
the b·uilding back there ·with the consent of Harry Hong. 
Then he apparently caught himself and added, "who was 
also one of the six," and that Harry Hong was going to 
handle the restaurant part of it and :ilieDermond and 
his partners were going to handle the back part. But 
to his knowledge "It u·aB all supposed to be under the 
one corporation of these six different people, which 
Harry Hong was one of them." He "~as then asked "Did 
he tell you it was a corporation~" He ans,,ered "He told 
me there was six partners, that he U'as on-e of them-
Harry Hong was one of them, and I believe there was 
a Mr. Lee uptown that was a Chinese - that has a 
Chinese restaurant, and th-ere 'vas two or three other 
partne·rs." He was asked if there was ever anything 
said about a corporation in his conversations, and he 
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answered "They said it would be a company. I wouldn't 
know whether you would say it was a corporation or a 
company. It's just partners. lVIcDermond told me there 
was six partners there and Harry Hong was one of 
them." (R. 83) 
The next witness called by the plaintiff was 
Donald L. Buehner, who testified that he was 
the credit manager of said company during the year 
1954 and during the construction of the addition to the 
Golden Pheasant. He testified that his first conver13ation 
with Mr. Hong was during the construction of the 
back part. He was asked to tell what was said, if 
anything, regarding the .account. lie an.swered "I was 
cu'rious to know who was going to accept the liability 
for this. l\1r. 1\fcDermond had sent me to Harry 
Hong and I approached him and told him who I repre-
sented and that we were wondering who was going to 
pay for this merchandise. He said that he was going 
to get the money from McDermond, and indicated if that 
happened he would pay for it." (R. 85) H·e was then 
asked if he had any subsequent conversation with Harry 
Hong. He answered "Yes. I approached him. I don't 
know exactly how many times - four or five times in 
that front part of his restaurant.." He was asked whether 
or not all of the conversations were relative to the col-
lection of this .account, and he answered "Yes . . . I 
tried to get an answer from him. He kind of would not 
commit himse.lf. I used the logic that there was a possi-
bility of him being liable for it and if he knew that 
because he had a lease, trying to get an answer fro,Jn 
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him, and he recognized me and knew I was from Buehner 
Block towards the end of our visits." This last is accented 
for the purpose of accenting the fact that plaintiff never 
relied on the leasehold or Hong and th·at the defendant 
Hong is not overly observant or overburdened with the 
ability of knowing all that goes on about him (R. 85). 
Upon cross examination, ~Ir. Buehner was asked the 
question ''Had Mr. McDermond ordered the block from 
you or your company~" He answered "Yes. Well, someone 
called and ordered for the Golden Pheasant. We investi-
gated because Mrs. Glezos didn't know anything about it. 
We looked up the owner of the Golden Pheasant and so 
went over there and ~Ir. ~IcDermond was there and said 
that it was he that ordered in this Golden Pheasant name 
and we changed it." At this point it should be noted that 
the first order placed for supplies was on the 14th day of 
July, 1954, as per order slip #28:297, and the same was 
charged to C. C. McDermond c/o Golden Pheasant. The 
next order was placed the following day as per order-
slip No. 28326, dated the 15th day of July~ 1954, and 
on that and others thereafter the deliveries were charged 
to C. C. McDermond alone and c/o Copa Supper Club and 
mention is not made again of cjo Golden Pl1easant (order 
and delivery slips bet,veen R. 39 and -±0). The next ques-
tion asked him was "In other words._ your contract was 
with McDermond. Is that correct f" To which he answ·ered 
"Yes.'' Thereafter he was asked if he intended to look for 
payment to Mr. McDermond. He answered "No. When we 
learne~d that out we had had experience "ith !Ir. McDer-
mond before and for that reason we were looking for 
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liability." The next question was asked "So it was too 
late. Mr. McDermond had the blocks and it was too 
late." He answered then "No, not exactly." (R. 85) He 
admitted that Harry Hong had never signed any invoice 
or delivery slips and that he had never sent appellant 
Hong a statement. In answer to the question "Did 
Harry Hong ever agree to pay you for these blocks~'' 
he answered uunder the condition that 1V.lcDermond 
would pay him." The court then asked the witness "Was 
this after they were laid up or before~" The witness 
answered "Well, I can't exactly remember. I think the 
first conversation with Harry Hong was during the 
construction of jt." The court then asked "And it is 
during the time that they were being laid up that he 
said he would pay you if McDermond paid him~" The 
witness answered "Well, it was right close to that time." 
(R. 86) Reference again is made to the fact that this 
witness testified that when the order was first placed 
it was placed and ordered in cjo Golden Pheasant n.ame, 
and that thereafter they changed the order so that it 
reflected the fact to be that the orders were made by 
and in behalf of promoter McDermond and it is sub-
mitted by an examination of the delivery sheets that 
this change was made within 24 hours. 
Mr. Clyde then cross examined the witness and he 
testified that he checked the city directory when the 
order was first put in and thereafter called owner 
G.lezos' wife and she didn't seem to know anything about 
owner Glezos ordering the block so they went over to 
the job. The question was asked "And the jobs had not 
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yet been laid up on that first call, had they~" The wit-
ness answered "I don~t think they were." He was 
then asked "You don't think they were~ Is that your 
answer f' He answered "Yes." 
At this point the plaintiffs rested, and Mr. Clyde 
moV?ed the court for an order of dismissal with pre-
judice on the basis that one can't hold a mechanic's 
lien against any landlord, and cited the case of Marrow. 
vs. Merrit, 16 Utah 412, 52 Pac 667. The court then 
asked the plaintiff's attorney, Conder, whether or not 
they claimed a lien against owner Glezos, to which they 
answered yes, they wished to foreclose against the lease 
that Harry Hong had on the premises. The court then 
said that it was the plaintiffs if they wanted it (this 
before appellant had opportunity to put on defense), 
to which Mr. Conder replied "\\' e may pursue that 
remedy as long as it has been agreed here in court." 
The court then made the statement "The difficulty is, 
Mr. Conder, he didn't mislead thenz in any u·ay. He just 
happened to be the owner." To "·hich :Jir. Conder replied 
"His silence mislead then1." Mr. Cl~·de then states "You 
haven't got testimony that ~~ou 'Yere dealing with the 
owner." The court to this stated ""I don't think there 
is any estoppel in any ·zcay again sf Jf r. Gl e.zos:~-· (R. 87) 
It should be noted at this point that the court apparently 
was of the belief that there "~as no estoppel against Mr. 
Glezos, but that there was against appellant Hong, al-
though there is not one word of testi1nony to support 
such a belief. The court then made thi.s observation 
"Now as to this other phase of it, Mr. Ashworth, this 
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Mr. Watson lends sonte doubt about the matter as to 
Mr. Hong." (R. 88) To this 1\fr. Ashworth replied that 
Mr. Buehner relied upon 1fr. Hong for payment only 
after the blocks had been delivered and they found out to 
whon1 they had delivered them. That they were grasping 
at straws to find out who was going to pay a.s long as Mr. 
McDermond couldn't pay. That they made their contract 
strictly with Mr. McDermond (R. 88). At this point, evi-
dently witness Watson, who the respondents would like to 
allege as being a disinterested person, felt so strongly 
in the matter so ~s to bring attention to himself and to 
t_he court, because the court interrupted counsel and 
stated "Mr. Watson, do you want to say some-
thing~" To which Mr. Watson answered "Yes." Then 
the court, upon it.s own motion and volition stated "Just 
com-e in here." (R. 88) Upon this invitation by the court, 
Mr. Watson, who supposedly is an unbiased and dis-
interested witness testified as follows: "At least five 
different times McDermond promised and told me that 
he would see Mr. Hong and Hong's associate uptown 
to get me money for the work I had done. When I first 
took the job he promised to pay me half of it before 
I was even finished with the job .and the other half on 
completion." The court then asked "That is McDer-
mond ~" Mr. Watson, replied "Mr. McDermond. He said 
he would see his partners uptown (R. 88), Mr. Hong 
and the other Chinaman." At this point Mr. Ashworth 
made an objection to the te.stimony as to what Mr. Mc-
Dermond said. To this objection the court took no notice. 
whatsoever. Mr. Watson then carried on without waiting 
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for the court to pass on the objection of Mr. Ashworth, 
and stated "And they would get the money. Then after 
a week or two weeks after he got through with the 
' building, he gave me the stall because he said that Mr. 
Hong and his associate uptown had refused to put any 
more money up to handle the paying of the labor, which 
they h~ad agreed to do. (It is noted that here witness 
claimed Hong was to pay labor yet admitted that he 
expected and was p.aid himself for labor by McDermond. 
Also, it just doesn't make sense that Hong would put 
into a partnership of six, his lease, expensive fixtures 
and pay labor bills for improvements for nothing or 
the privilege to .sh~are with five others in profits as a. 
partner; or stock or club control in return). And that 
threw McDermond into a jackpot because tu·o fellows 
had backed down on their agreement, and as a result 
there was one fellow that u·orked for me that has still 
got $150.00 coming off of tlzat because jfr. Hong and 
his partner ... " (R. 89) 
At this point ~Ir. Ash"Torth again objected to the 
testimony given by jlr. \"'\~ atson. The court again failed to 
pass upon this obJection, and allo"Ted ~Ir. \\~atson to fin-
ish, "~1r. I-Iong and his partner refused to pa~T .any fur-
ther payments." 1Jpon this staten1ent, the court said ·'All 
right," with never a '\\rord concerning the objections made 
by Mr. Ash,vorth, nor any apparent realization of the 
fact that said witness "'".as anything but an unbiased and 
unprejudiced witness, ina.smuch as he had difficulty being 
paid and one fello'\\r '\\7ho worked for hin1 still had $150.00 
coming fro1n the job. Thereafter, ~Ir. Conder argued that 
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they didn't have to know that a partnership existed .at the 
time materials were delivered and that when one learns 
the existence of a principal he can hold the principal li-
able. To this ~fr. Ashworth replied "Of course there is no 
partnership. Only on Mr. Watson's testimony." (R. 89) 
The court then stated "Mr. Hong, as I understand him, 
said there vvas no partnership. That he was going to 
sell the property to ~1r. 11cDermond if and when he 
got some money, and I sort of gatheTed from his testi-
mony that pending these negotiations and pending the 
getting of the money McDermond paid the rent. N o'v 
that is the essence, is it not, of Mr. Hong's testimonyf' 
(R. 89) Mr. Ashworth agre.ed that an agreement to sell 
had been made up but there was not a copy to be sub-
mitted in evidence, to which the court replied "Well, 
we ·don't have that here. But the thing that is quite 
impressive is Mr. Watson's statement that Mr. Hong 
said he was a partner." (R. 89) To this Mr. Ashworth 
replied "The only thing Mr. Watson testified to is hear-
say from Mr. 11cDermond," and that Mr. McDermond 
couldn't bind Hong on a partnership basis by his state-
ments, at least he didn't think so. The court thereupon 
made the statement "But the thing that is troublesome 
is this statement th.at Hong was supposed to have said. 
'I am a partner with this man. He and I are· partners 
with four others.' " To which Mr. Ashworth replied 
"Of course I will agree that we have some conflicting 
testimony." The court thereupon stated "In addition to 
that, you have this other situation of Hong having a le.ase 
on this property and consenting that they go in and do 
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this remodeling which is somewhat of an unusual situa-
tion." (R. 90) (It might be noted that there is nothing 
any more unusual about this situ·ation than the same 
and similar situation that owner Glezo~ was in relation 
to promoter l\IcDermond). At this point the court's 
attention was again focused upon witness w·atson by his 
apparent antics in open court at the backs of counsel for 
the court at this point said uJust a 1ninute M'r. Watson. 
We will call on you. They had to get Mr. Glezos' consent, 
of course. I suppose under the lease that he couldn't tear 
his building down without his consent. Well he consents to 
that. They also had to get ~Ir. Hong's consent because he 
had a lease on the property. Now he consents there and 
they remodel his building. His business in effect they dis-
puted. They take a ;.back i'Wall out of his building that 
he had been using there. He must have had some interest 
in it more than just a prospective seller with no money 
down. If I were running a cafe and you came in and 
wanted to buy 1ny cafe I wouldn't let you start tearing 
it to pieces before you put some money in unless I had 
son1e arrangements w·ith you, either as .a partner or 
something in that nature." (R. 90) To this reasoning 
it would be a safe bet what happened wouldn't have 
happened if the trial judge had been the owner instead 
of Glezos and the question Inight be asked, " .. hy must 
there be more interest in a party allo"i.ng such, than 
'the interest of a prospective seller or co-tenant, espe-
cially in a case in which the prospective seller was not 
making 1none·y and was in ill health? Mr. A.shworth 
then stated "Of course l\fr. Hong testified ti1at he didn't 
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give them the consent for remodeling the building or 
to tear it down. He agreed to sell his part to them, his 
fixtures in the cafe." The court thereupon said "Well, 
the only trouble is he tells Mr. Watson he is a partner 
there." Mr. Ashworth then replied "Of course that is 
Mr. Watson'.s word agains~t that of Mr. Hong." The 
court then took upon itself to state, and again act as coun-
sel for plaintiff, "Come in, .~..o/1 r. Watson, if you want to 
testify further." Mr. Watson then had this to say "The 
fellow that has worked for me over a period of two 
years just left and went and got the information I 
think he can testify that Harry Hong .signed a check." 
Mr. Ashworth at this point made an objection to him 
testifying. The court thereupon, on its own motion and 
volition stated "If he can testify you had better bring 
him in. We can't have you testifying for. him." Mr. 
Watson then testified "He got the check signed hy Harry 
Hong." The court then asked "Is he here~" Mr. Draper 
said, "Come forward," and the court said, "Let me see 
that man .. " Mr. Conder then stated "He was paid a check 
by a Chinaman, Your Honor. He doesn't know whether 
it was Mr. Hong or not." Mr. Kinze-r, who was the wit-
ness then stated, on his own behalf "Yes it was." Mr. 
Conder then asked the court if they could reopen the 
case, and the court s-aid they could. 
At this point, it should be noted that Mr. Kinzer 
was brought to this trial by the plaintiffs. His identity 
as a witne.ss was never disclosed in answer to written 
interrogatories submitted prior to trial (R. 36, 37, 40). 
Undoubtedly Mr. Kinzer was interrogated by the plain-
tiffs' attorneys, and as a result of these interrogations, 
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the plaintiff's attorney, Mr. c·onder, made the statement 
before Mr. Kinzer took the st~and, to the effect as above 
related "He was paid a check by a Chinaman, Your 
Honor. lie doesn't know whether it was lYir. Hong or 
not." (R. 91) It should be observed that righi after that 
Mr. Kinzer volunteered the information, after having 
observed the actions of the court, the antics of his em-
ployer Watson, and the testimony preceeding the state-
ment by Mr. Conder, "Yes it was." 
Mr. Wayne R. Kinzer was then called as a witness 
on behalf of the plaintiff. He stated that he did brick 
work on the building and testified that he was paid for 
that work by 1.oitness Watson, his employer, but there-
after there was so1ne added zrork that he hadn't been 
paid for (R. 91). L~ pon such a statement made and admit-
ted by the witness, it can hardly be argued that this wit-
ness was unbiased or prejudiced in this action. Then he 
was asked "Did you ever receive any check from :llr. 
Hong?" (R. 91) To this he ans\Yered ·'Yes.'~ That he 
had received a check fron1 ~Ir. Hong so1ne time in Sep-
teinber, and that the san1e \Yas for een1ent work on the 
extension on the Golden Pheasant restaurant. 
·upon cross exa1nination, 1\Ir. Kinzer testified 
that the check "Tas in the an1ount of $71.00 (R. 92). 
After the testin1onY of !Ir. l{inzer the court then 
.asked "JJir. Ashworth., do you desire to put nzore 
test1>n1ony on P'' (R. 93) It might be "Torthy to note 
that up to this point :Thfr. Ashworth had not had the 
opportunity· to put an~r testin1on~r on 'Yhatsoever as all 
witnesses had been called by the plaintiff or the court. 
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Appellant Hong was then called as a witness on 
his own behalf and he testified. He denied that he had 
any conversation whatsoever with Mr. Watson concern-
ing having a partnership with Mr. McDermond, he had 
never stopped to talk to him except one time when he 
asked who was going to pay, to which he replied "I 
don't know," and that he told him that he had nothing 
to do with it because the building and material was 
ordered by McDermond. On cross examination he testi-
fied that he didn't know who !1r. Buehner was. It should 
be recalled at this point that even Mr. Buehner had 
some question in his mind to the effect that I-Iarry Hong 
only started to recognize him towards the end of his 
numerous visits to the cafe. The court asked of Mr. 
Hong, on its o\\rn behalf, whether or not he had ever 
given the young man Kinzer any money or a check. 
Appellant Hong replied "No.'' He was questioned "for 
cement work" and he replied "No." (R. 93, 94). 
Upon this testimony in review of the ease, the court 
made it.s omnibus findings of fact No. 5 (R. 98). Fro1n 
this finding of fact, .and this fact alone, the court can1e 
to the conclusion, that judgment should be entered in 
favor of the plaintiffs and against appellant, without one 
shred of trial evidence concerning at whose ins.tance the 
South State Builders Supply material was furnished. 
Upon the foregoing finding and a conclusion that 
plaintiff's lien should be foreclosed against appellant 
(R. 99), the court entered judgment in favor of the 
plaintiffs and against the defendant Harry Hong, in 
the sum of $771.94 in favor of plaintiff Buehner Block 
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Co., and the sum of $436.56 in favor of South State 
Builders Supply; foreclo.sing all of the defendant's 
right, title and interest in and to the described property, 
in which defendant had a leasehold interest. 
Appellant filed a motion for a new trial and to 
amend the findings conclusions, and judgment, upon the 
ground set forth at R. 106, 107 and supported by affi-
davits which stand uncontradicted in the record (R. 102 
to 105). The court did amend the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law so as to amend Paragraph 5 to show 
defendant Hong as a partner instead of a partner and 
agent, but denied defendant's motion for a new trial 
(R. 108). 
This appeal is prosecuted from the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, judgment so entered, and the whole 
thereof. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COMPLAINT OF THE PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO 
STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE 
GRAN·TED THE PLAINTIFFS. SO FAR AS DEFENDANT 
AND APPELLANT HARRY HONG IS CONCERNED. 
Concerning plaintiffs first cause of action, the fore-
closure of a lien action, no Notice of Lien ''hatsoever be-
ing recorded or lien alleged against the leasehold interest 
of appellant Hong, it is impossible to foreclose a lien 
not in existence. Plaintiffs complaint does not state a 
claim or facts sufficient to 1nake appellant Hong per-
sonally liable to plaintiffs in a foreclosure of said lien 
action brought against owner Glezos. 
Concerning plaintiffs second rause of ac.tion, the 
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unjust enrichment action, the fact that Appellant Hong 
claimed a leasehold interest in the real property, the 
fact that the plaintiffs on their own for the benefit of 
all the named defendants or each of them furnished 
materials with the knowledge, consent or approval of 
all the named defendants or e~ach of them, certainly does 
not state a claim or facts sufficient upon which .appellant 
Hong would be personally liable. Every .stockholder in 
the clubs or any workman on the job could be found to 
have some interest in the property, would have bene-
fitted by the plaintiffs furnishing materials on their 
own or in reliance upon the orders placed by promoter 
McDermond and Copa Sup·pe.r Club Van N oy; could have 
had knowledge, consented and approved of the material 
being furnished and they could hardly in the absence 
of an allegation of contractual relationship or estoppel 
be liable for payment of such materials furnished. 
Owner Glezo·s certainly claimed an interest in the real 
property, he benefitted by some, if not all of the ma-
terials furnished, he knew definitely of the materials 
being furnished because he was contacted immedi-
ately after the first material was furnished and he 
certainly approved of the material being furnished in-
asmuch as he gave permission for the building to be 
added to. Admitting all of these allegations. to be true 
in one degree or another as they are in the case at bar, 
said complaint still does not and did not in the absence 
of further allegations of a contractual liability or estop-
pel state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
The trial court found in effect this to be true in dis-
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miSSing plaintiffs action against owner Glezos and so 
should have granted appellant Hong's motion to dismiss 
plaintiffs action because the complaint likewise failed 
to state a claim .against Appellant Hong (R. 6). 
Further, to recover in an action of Quasi Contract 
or c·ontract Implied in Law a benefit must be conferred 
or received either (1) through mistake; (2) in the per-
formance of a contract; (3) through the commission of 
a tort; or ( 4) through duress. If a benefit is conferred 
under any other situation it is usually said to be con-
ferred voluntarily and no quasi contractual obligation 
arises. The complaints of the plaintiffs are silent as to 
how the benefit was conferre·d upon, or received by 
appellant Hong; Beyond the fact that plaintiff Buehner 
Block Co. agreed to furnish materials to C. C. 
McDermond who was a building contractor, under a sales 
contract made between the said C. C. ~IeDermond and 
the plaintiff Buehner Block Co. by the terms of 
which plaintiff Buehner Block Co. agreed to furnish 
materials as required and the said C. C. ~IeDermond 
agreed to pay the plaintiff Buehner Block Co. there-
for in full on or before the tenth of the month 
following the 1nonth of purchase (Exhibits 1 and 2). 
That plaintiff South State Builders Supply furnished 
1naterials to Spencer \ 7an Noy, 'Yho ""'"as the general 
contractor, under a contract 1uade bet""'"een Nick and 
J(atina Glezos and Spenrer \;an Noy~ by the ter1n.s of 
which plaintiff South State Builders Supply did agree 
to furnish and deliver n1aterials .and said Spencer r'an 
Nay and Nick and I~atina (i-lezos d.£d agree to pay the 
plaintiff South State Builders Supply therefor the suin 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
35 
of $394.84 (Exhibits 3 and 4). 
There is no alleg.ation whatsoever that Harry I-Iong. 
was a partner of any of the defendants or individuals 
named in the complaint or in s:aid contracts referred to 
in Exhibits 2 and 4. There being an exzJress contract 
in being between plaintiffs .and said named individuals 
under which the materials were furnished and no partner-
ship allegation that appellant Hong was a partner of 
any or all of the individuals and liable therefor, an 
implied or Quasi Contract action cannot exist. The law 
on this matter is set forth in 12 Am. Jur. 505, Sec. 7. 
The text writer there .states : 
"There cannot be an express and an implied 
contract for the same thing existing at the same 
time. It is only when parties do not expressly 
agree that the law interposes and raises a pro-
mise. No agreement can be implied where there 
is an express one existing." 
Citing cases, footnotes 19 and 20, Footnote 20 cites the 
Utah case of Verdi vs. Helper State Bank, 57 Ut. 502, 
196 P 225, 15 ALR 641, in which the court stated : 
"A contract may not be implied where an 
express contract exists.'' Also, "In a law case the 
verdict cannot be sustained on .appeal if the evi-
dence does not support the allegations of the com-
plaint, even though the evidence might have sup-
ported findings in plaintiffs favor, if the allega-
tions of the complaint had been different, and 
were subject to amendment after introduction 
of evidence, since the Supreme Court has not 
original jurisdiction in such c.ases, and cannot 
enter judgment merely because it thinks one or 
the other of the parties is entitled to prevail." 
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The plaintiffs having an express contract in existence 
by their own admis.sion concerning the furnishing of 
said materials with named individuals, plaintiffs second 
cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted so far as defendant and appellant Harry 
Hong is concerned. 
Partnership liability was never raised by the plead-
ings prior to trial. The most that could be said from the 
pleadings was that appellant Hong was a co-tenant with 
the other tenants. This court in the case of Rocky Moun-
tain Stud Farm Co. vs. Lunt et al, 40 Ut. 299, 151 P 
521, in distinguishing and holding that co-tenants were 
not partners stated : 
"The partners have a joint interest in the 
a~sets of the partnership, and are required to sue 
and be sued jointly in reference thereto." 
This privilege was not afforded the appellant. In the 
case of Prows vs. Hawley et al, 72 Dt. 444, 271 P 31, 
citing numerous Utah cases, it is stated: 
"Until the court has found on all the material 
issued raised by the pleadings, findings are in-
sufficient to support judgment." 
It is the contention of appellant in tlz is case that i.t i.s 
Just as tt"tte that in the case U)het"e findi11gs of fact, con-
clusions of law, and judgn1.ent are rendered and all at·e 
dependent upon such a vital an-d rnaterial issue as part-
nership liability, the absence of which is not 1·aised by 
the pleadings and is omitted and not alleged in the 
complaint, it is self evident that the contplai1~t is not 
sufficient and is fatally defective and fails to state a 
claim upon u;hich relief can be granted. 
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POINT II 
THE FINDINGS OF F AGT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENTS 
IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS. 
The court concluded that plaintiffs were entitled to 
judgment ag.ainst appellant Harry Hong and in favor 
of plaintiffs (R. 99). It further concluded that plain-
tiffs were not entitled to foreclose their lien.s against 
defendant and owner Glezos but these s.ame liens could be 
foreclosed against ~'appellant Harry Hong's leas.ehold 
interest, and the sheriff should sell the same as on execu-
tion and apply the proceeds derived therefrom upon the 
money judgment (R. 101). This the court did without 
a lien or Notice of Lien recorded ag.ainst a partnership, 
the appellant Hong or against his leas.ehold interest. 
It is an elementary fact that there must be a lien to fore-
close before a foreclosure can be ordered and Chapter 38, 
Section 1, Paragraph 7 of the Utah Code 1953 provides 
that the same must be filed and recorded. The trial court 
found only the following material findings of fact. 
2-3. Plaintiff Buehner Block Co. furnished 
building materials in the reasonable sum of $695.51 and 
plaintiff South State Builders Supply Co. furnished 
building material in the reasonable sum of $394.87 for 
improving property owned by Glezos. 
4. That appellant Hong had a leasehold on said 
property. 
5. That said materials were furnished at the in-
stance of the defendant Charles C. McDermond, who 
was then and there acting as a partner of the defendant, 
Harry Hong. 
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6-7. That plaintiff Buehner Block Co. and South 
State Builders Supply C-o. recorded a lien against said 
real property. 
The above findings certainly do not find that there 
was a lien or Notice of Lien recorded against appellant 
Hong or upon his leasehold interest which could be fore-
closed against by the plaintiffs. 
Said findings do not find that appellant and defen-
dant Hong or Charles C. McDermond, acting a.s his 
partner, were unjustly enriched or what benefit was 
conferred upon either individually or the found but 
unalleged partnership. 
There is no finding as to what kind, type or scope 
of business the found but unalleged partnership was 
in when promoter McDermond was acting as a partner 
of defendant, Harry Hong, nor that the liability was 
the result of acts done within the scope of partnership 
busines.s. "A partnership alu·ays ex·ists as a 'result of a 
voluntary contract between the persons held to be part-
ners and n,ever exists solely by operatio,n of la·w. Part-
nership by estoppel or holding out is only an apparent 
and not real exception to this rule." (22 A1n. & Eng. 
Ency. Law p. 1-t) Certainly there "~as no partnership 
contract alleged or found bet"~een defendant Hong and 
other defendants in this case, nor ""as there .a finding 
estopping the appellant Harry Hong fron1 denying that 
a partnership did exist. 
There is no finding .as to 'vhat relationship, if any, 
Appellant Hong had individually or as a found partner 
to the other defendants "Copa Supper Club," ''\Talley 
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Amusement Enterprises, Inc." and Charles C. McDer-
mond individually, and against whom default judgments 
were entered for these same materials, nor with Copa 
Supper Club Van N oy who was the only person who 
ordered, purchased and paid upon the material furnished 
by plaintiff South State Builders Supply Co. 
This court in llfitchell v. Jensen, et al., 29 Ut. 346, 
81 Pac. 165, headnotes 4 and 8, stated: 
"Where certain of the defendants were un-
known to the transaction, except as they may have 
been members of the alleged partnership, or were 
obligors arising from their connection with an 
abortive corporation, the failure of the court to 
find what connection or relation such defendants 
had with the corporation, or what they had to do 
therewith, or what they had to do with the bus,i-
ness and dealings carried on in its name, was 
fatal to the right of plaintiff to a judgment against 
such defendants as partners." 
"It is the duty of the trial court to find on 
all the material issue·s made by the pleadings, 
whether evidence be introduced or not, and, if 
there be no finding on a material issue the judg-
ment cannot be supported." 
The fact that the complaint or pleadings fail to allege 
a partnership between defendant and appellant Hong 
and others is hardly an excuse for not finding what con-
nection or relation defendant Hong and defendant Mc-
Dermond had toward the partnership, with its undis-
closed business, its undisclosed name, or the other defen-
dants named in plaintiff's comp}aints. 
There is no finding whatsoever that the materials 
furnished at the instance of the defendant Charles C. 
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McDermond were purchased within the scope of the 
found but unalleged partnership business. There isn't 
even a finding that the materials furnished were de-
livered to, purchased by, or sold to Harry Hong individ-
ually or within the scope of the partnership business. 
The court in Prows vs. Hawley, et al, 72 Ut. 444, 271 
P 31, in an action for the price of oats delivered to one 
member of partnership at page 456 of 72 TJtah states: 
"True, a memb-er of a partnership may, be-
cause of his membership be held individually 
liable for a partnership debt or obligation in-
curred within the scope of the partnership busi-
nes.s. But, as seen, no partnership or partnership 
liability or obligation is alleged and none found. 
And on the complaint no judgment could have 
been taken against the partnership. The only lia-
bility alleged and found against the defendants 
was a personal and individual liability incurred 
at their 'special instance and request'." 
The rule of law and the courts finding in the above 
case is set out in headnote 9 of 72 l"T"t. 446, which is as 
follows: 
"In an action for the price of oats delivered 
to one member of a partnership, omnibus finding 
that oats were purchased by and delivered to 
defendants at their • special instance and requesf 
would not suffice as finding that oats were pur-
chased within the scope of partnership business; 
word 'special' denoting particular kind or char-
acter distinct from other kinds an exceptional cha~acte;; word 'instance' denoting an impelling 
motive, Influence, or cause, at the solicitation or 
suggestion of; word 'request' denoting an expres-
sion or desire to some one for something, to ask~ 
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and the phrase 'at his ~pecial instance and re-
quest' denotes something which in its nature and 
in a degree is personal, something solicited, sug-
gested, or requested by one personally, or some 
one for or on his behalf." 
As in this cited Prows vs. Hawley case, this is an 
action for the price of materials not so much as even 
delivered as in the cited c.as.e but only furnished to one 
member of an unalleged but found partnership, and the 
omnibus finding No. 5 in thi.s case is not by any means 
as far reaching as in the cited case in which the finding 
was that "oats were purchased by and delivered to de-
fendants" but only here that "materials were furnished" 
and not as in the cited case at their "special instance and 
request" but only at the "instance of the defendant, 
Charles C. McDermond." 
The cited omnibus finding was not such as would 
suffice as finding that oats were purchased within the 
scope of p1artnership business. The omnibus No. 5 find-
ing in this case finding only that materials were "furn-
ished" (not purchased and delivered) at the instance 
of the defendant Charles C. ltl cDermond, (not at their 
special instance and request) can hardly be such a find-
ing as to suffice a finding that materials were purchased 
within the scope of partnership business; word "furn-
ishing" denoting to supply, provide, provide for use, 
deliver whether gratuitously or otherwise; word "iln-
stance'' denoting a~ in the above cited case an impelling 
motive, influence, or cause, at the solicitation or sugges-
tion of; and the phrase "at the instance of the defendant 
Charles C. McDermond" certainly denotes more than in 
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the cited case something which in its nature and in a 
degree is personal, something solicited, suggested or 
requested by one personally, or by someone for or on 
his behalf; it spells out more than a mere degree, it 
does denote personal, solicited, suggested or requested 
by one - that one being Charles C. McDermond. 
P'OINT III 
·T'HE OMNIBUS FINDING NO. 5 OF THE TRIAL COURT 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND 
IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE OVER-
WHELMING WEIGHT THEREOF. 
The trial court by finding materials were furnished 
at the instance of the defendant, promoter McDermond, 
who was then and there acting as the partner of appel .. 
lant Hong, in effect found appellant Hong promising 
to pay the debts of another, without plaintiffs pleading 
or alleging the same so as to afford appellant Hong 
the opportunity to den·y, answer or plead the statute 
of frauds "\vhich provides that a promise to pay the 
debt of another must be in "\vriting signed by the party 
to be charged. 
Appellant is fully a"\vare of the rule that this court 
will not weigh evidence and "\viii sustain a judgment in 
a law action if the srune is supported by competent, 
substantial evidence. But this court .. in Contin.e'ntal Ba'nk 
and Trust Co. vs. Steu·art, 4 Ut. 2nd 228, 291 P 2nd 890, 
citing Seybold vs. Union Pacift~c Railroad Co., 239 P 
2nd 174, said: 
·'Though positive testin1ony of "\Yitness be-
lieved by trial court is ordinarily regarded as suf-
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ficient to compel affirmance of trial courts find-
ing, it is not necessarily so under .all circum-
stance." "Though certain testimony standing 
alone may be sufficient to support finding, it must 
always be appraised in light of attendant circum-
stances and countervailing testimony and if, when 
so viewed, it appe.ars so clearly and palpably un-
reasonable that no fact trier acting fairly and 
reasonably could accept it, then it must be re-
jected as matter of law, and fact determined 
otherwise." 
Concerning that portion of omnibus finding No. 5 
which finds s.aid materials were furnished at the instance 
of defendant, Charles C. McDermond, there is not one 
scintilla of evidence that the materials furnished by South 
State Builders Supply Co. ·were sold, delivered or 
even so mttch as furnished to Charles C. McDermond. 
The only evidence on this is contradicted by plaintiffs 
own writing and admissions (R. 36, Notice of Lien, Ex-
hibit 4, delivery and order slips, Exhibit 3), whi'ch recite 
even under o.ath that said materials were furnished to 
Copa Supper Club Van N oy for and on behalf of Copa 
Supper Club and owner Glezos. 
There is not a scintilla of evidence that the materials 
furn,ished by plaint-iff Buehner Block Co. U'ere sold 
to the found but unalleged partnership of McDermond, 
Hong, and others, and within the unalleged and unfound 
scope of said found but unalleged partnership. It is the 
uncontradicted evidence that the said materials were sold 
to McDermond personally or as a representative of the 
Valley Amusement Enterprises Inc., or/and the Copa 
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Supper Club, and not dealing with a partnership, as is 
.stated by counsel for plaintiff, "McDern1ond is the one 
who ordered the material, I must admit that so far as 
the direct contract is concer11ted we have no direct con-
tract with 1\fr. Hong nor 1\tfr. Glezos" (R. 47). Substan-
tiated by the testimony of plaintiffs witness, Donald 
Buehner, "I approached him (Hong) and told him who I 
represented and that we were wondering who was going 
to pay." (R. 84) 
"I approached him (Hong), I don't know exactly 
how many times, four or five times in that front part of 
his restaurant. Q. "And were all the conversations rela-
tive to the collection of this account!" A. "Yes. I tried 
to get an answer from him. He kind of would not commit 
himself. I used the logic that there was a possibility of 
his being liable for it and if he knew that because he had 
a lease trying to get an answer from him and he recog-
nized me and knew I was from Buehner Block toward the 
end of our t·isits." Q. "Didn't Mr. 1\tlcDermond order the 
block from you or your company f' .A. •'Y es. Well some-
one called and ordered for the Golden Pheasant. We 
investigated because !Irs. Glezos didn't know anything 
about it. We looked up the O""'ller of the Golden Pheasant 
and so we went over there and lJfr. J.llcDerrnotul ·zcas there 
and said that it was he that ordered in this Golden 
Pheasant name and we changed it." Q ... In other words, 
your contract was with 1\fcDermond, is that correctf" 
A. "Yes. Of cour.se it was after the blocks "~ere delivered 
that we found this out." Q. "And ,rere you intending to 
look for payment from J.l! cDermond, is that true'!" A. 
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"No. When we learned that out (note first order and 
delivery slip made out and dated 7/14/54 charged to C. C. 
McDermond cjo Golden Pheasant and all others subse-
quent beginning with the following day 7/15/54 made out 
to C. C. McDermond cjo Copa Supper Club. Between 
R. 39 and 40, also Exhibit 1), we had had experience with 
Mt·. McDern~ond before and for that reason we were 
looking for liability." Appellant cannot resist the obser-
vation that if there is a basis for finding estoppel in this 
case that the same could certainly be invoked against 
plaintiff Buehner. Q. "So it was too late, Mr. Me-
Dermond had the blocks, and it was too late~" A. "Not 
exactly." (R. 85) Again plaintiff admits that it was not 
too late to have protected himself if he thought it was 
to his .advantage to still be looking for liability prior to 
the time the material furnished was u.sed. If it was to his 
advantage to have talked with Hong before the block was 
up he did that, if it was to his advantage not to have done 
so then he didn't talk to appellant. The fact is that after 
he was appraised in his first conversation with owner 
Glezos he furnished material by his own te,stimony in 
reliance upon promoter lVIcDermond alone and the repre-
sentations made on behalf of defendants Valley Amuse-
ment Enterprises, Inc. and Copa Supper Club. l-Ie did so 
with his eyes open knowing full well with whom he was 
dealing and it was not with a partnership. 
Assuming that s.aid materials were "purchased" 
instead of merely being "furnished," there isn't a scin-
tilla of evidence that the same were purchased by a part-
nership or within the scope of the business of a partner-
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ship. Plaintiff South State Builders Sup·ply sole and only 
evidence is that said materials were purchased from them 
and paid thereon solely by Supper Club Van N oy and 
the Copa Supper Club (R. 36, Exhibits 3 and 4) ; at the 
instance of Nick Glezos (allegation 5 of plaintiffs com-
plaint, R. 18). Plaintiff Buehner Block Co.'s evidence 
was that said materials were purchased by pro-
moter McDermond for and on behalf of owner Glezos 
(Exhibit 2), were furnished at the instance of Nick Glezos 
(allegation 5 of plaintiffs complaint, R. 1), were pur-
chased by McDermond individually, by the Valley Amuse-
ment Enterprises, and the Copa Supper Club (default 
papers R. 13 and 14). 
Assuming that said materials were "ordered" in-
stead of merely being "furnished at the instance" there 
isn't a scintilla of evidence that the sa1ne we're ordered 
by a partnership or within the scope of the bus·iness of a 
partnership. Plaintiff South State Builders Supply sole 
evidence and only evidence is that san1e ''ere ordered by 
Supper Club \'"an Noy (R. 36, Exhibits 3 and 4); at the 
instance of Nick Glezos (allegation 5 of plaintiffs com-
plaint, R. 18). Plaintiff Buehner Block Co.'s evidence 
was that said 1naterials \vere purchased by pro-
Inoter l\IcDermond for and on behalf of owner Glezos 
(Exhibit 2); at the instance of Nick Glezos (allegation 
5 of plaintiffs con1plaint, R. 1 and 2): by ~fcDermond 
individually; by the \Talley Amuse1nent Enterprises; and 
the Copa Supper Club (default papers R. 13 .and 14). 
The only adverse testin1ony at the trial "~as the testimony 
of plaintiffs \vitness Don Buehner \Yho testified: That 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
47 
they investigated on the first order because Mrs. Glezos 
knew nothing about it. That they went over there. That 
McDennond was there and said to them that it was he 
that ordered in this "Golden Pheasant" name and so 
they changed the order. That their contract was with 
McDennond. That they weren't looking for payment 
from McDermond because they had learned by previous 
experience not to and for this reason were looking for 
liability. That McDermond at this time didn't exactly 
have the block (R. 85) but they were looking for some-
one to pay for the blocks 'vith McDermond. That Harry 
Hong never signed an invoice or delivery slip and that 
they never sent him a staten1ent and that they only talked 
to him about the amount. That Harry Hong never did 
agree to pay for the block. 
That the first conversation with Hong was, he be-
lieved, during the laying up of the block. That when they 
first investigated, they·~ telephoned J\tfr. Glezos and went 
over to the job and that he didn't think the bricks were 
laid up (R. 86). At no time whatsoever did plaintiff 
rely 'Upon or believe that they were dealing with a part-
nership. If the block was up when they first jnvestigated 
then they never relied upon a partnership. If it was 
partly up and as witnes.s says not too late (R. 85) to do 
something about the block delivered, it is certainly unjust 
to impose liability upon an unalleged, unproven but found 
partnership when plaintiffs had in their hands the privi-
lege and opportunity to have protected themselves or to 
reduce the loss they have incurred by acting timely. If 
the block wa.s not even laid up and -more materials were 
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furnished to McDermond after they had investigated and 
under the eontract they had with McDermond (R. 85 and 
86) it would be grossly unjust to impose an implied con-
tract by law upon appellant Hong for nothing he had 
done, by finding that he and McDermond were in a part-
nership and the partnership was the one that ordered, or 
at the instance of the partnership such materials were 
furnished. 
·. 
From this the question arises what kind of a part-
nership was it? Was it a construction partnership? 
There is no evidence as to what business or trade the 
unalleged but found partnership was in, what the scope 
of its business was, who its members were, what agree-
ment created the partnership, when it was created, what 
the members community interest was, los.s and profits. 
The case of Rocky Mountain -Stud Farnt Co. v. Lunt, et 
al., 46 Ut. 299, 151 P. 521, is herewith cited in support 
of what makes for finding of a partnership. 
Owner Glezos denied appellant Hong was in partner-
ship with McDer1nond (R. 70, 71, 72). Appellant Hong 
denied that he was ever in a partnership with McDer-
Inond, that he wasn't even a member of the Copa Supper 
Club or the \Talley Alnusement Enterprises or held stock 
in any of the same (R. 55). That he collected an exact 
rental of $250.00 a 1nonth from !IcDermond or others 
who occupied the pre1nises 'vhen he sublet to them. That 
this was the an1ount that he was paying to owner Glezos. 
~rhis uncontradicted evidence could hardly· be interpreted 
as a partner sharing in profits and loss, profitting there-
by. in an exact amount a.s this each month. The 22nd 
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Article of the Articles of Incorporation sets forth the 
best evidence, and supports the testimony of appellant 
Hong that he was to sell his leasehold to McDermond 
who in turn would utilize it for the use and benefit of the 
Copa Supper Club. 
The only testimony in support of a partnership is the 
oral, biased and prejudiced testimony of witness Watson, 
who by his own admission "wouldn't know whether it was 
a corporation or a company, just partners." (R. 83) He 
testified that he had about half a dozen conversations 
with Harry Hong and that no one was present at any of 
these conversations (R. 80). 
That McDermond told him they were going to have 
a night club and that he had built at least ten different 
night clubs, similar to this one, throughout the Rocky 
Mountain Area here and that the six of them were extend-
. ing that building back there with the consent of Harry 
Hong, who was also one of the six. That it was, to .his 
, knowledge, all supposed to be under the one corporation 
of these six different people which Harry Hong was one 
, of them. He was thereafter asked what was said about a 
. corporation. To this he answered "They said it would 
: be a company. I wouldn't know whether you u,ould say 
. it was a corporation or a company. It's just partners. 
McDermond told me there was six partners there and 
Harry Hong was one of them." (R. 83, 84). 
Concerning the requisite.s of a partnership, this court 
, in Bentley v. Brossard, et al., 33 Utah 396, 94 P. 736, said: 
"The requisites of a partnership are that the 
parties must have joined together to carry on a 
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trade or adventure for their common benefit, each 
contributing p~operty o.r services, .an?, ~;av~g a 
community of Interest m the profit~. . While a 
community of i;nterest i~ the p-rof~ts ~s not .of 
itself conclusive of the ex~stence of a partnersh~p, 
it is of the very essence of the contracts, and a 
partnership cannot exist without it." 
In the Cavanaugh v. Salisbury case, 22 Ut. 465, 63 
P. 39, it was said: 
"A partner without special authority can bind 
the firm only within the scope of the busines.s, and 
the firm, in. the absence of rat-ification,_ is not 
bound by any transaction of a partner outside the 
real or apparent scope." 
In Peterson v. Armstrong, 24 Ut. 96, 66 P. 767 it was 
said: 
"A partner, without special autho1·ity, has no 
power to bind the cotnpany in any t1·ansaction out-
side the apparent scope of the partnership busir 
ness, and persons dealing 1.cith the parl'l'ltership 
are bound to take notice thereof." 
Witness further testified he "~as giYen the stall by Mc-
Derinond for p.aYJ.nent of the block \York he did for Mc-
Dermond, and that one fello"~ that \YOrked for him still 
had $150.00 eon1ing fron1 the job for which he blamed 
appellant Hong because he and another Chinaman part-
ner were to pay the labor costs (R. 81 and 89). Admits 
that promoter ~fcDer1nond paid labor costs and in the 
same breath says appellant Hong "~as supposed to. 
Appellant submits that "~itness Watson ~s testimony 
when considered with his voluntary actions in open court, 
allowed and encouraged by the trial court conduct, that 
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his testimony does not constitute substantial evidence 
because Watson was an interested and biased witness, 
he had an axe to grind because he had to wait for his 
money and one n1an that worked for hin1 still had $150.00 
coming because two Chinamen didn't pay the labor bills 
(R. 81 and 89). It just doe.sn't make sense that appellant 
would contribute $36,000.00 worth of lease and equipment 
together with paying all labor costs on the building to be 
a member of a partnership of six. His testimony is all 
oral; his testimony is contradicted by owner Glezos, .a 
disinterested witness, and Hong, an interested witness; 
he doesn't know whether there was a partnership, corpo-
ration or company. His testimony should, therefore, be 
considered in the light of his interest. 
This court, in the recent case of Continental Bank 
and Tr~tst Co. v. Stewart, 4 Ut. 2nd 228, 291 P. 2nd 890, 
citing Seybold v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 239 
P. 2nd 174, said: 
"Rule that, in determining whether certain 
testimony is sufficient to support finding, it must 
be appraised in light of all attendant circum-
stances and countervailing testimony was p.articu-
larly applicable where testimony in question was 
that or witness who had vital personal interest in 
the controver.sy." 
Further, it is stated at 32 C.J.S. 1065, Sec. 1026: 
"The bias of a witness has a well known and 
pernicious influence in quickening or deadening 
his memory. This is especially true when he testi-
fied to conversations with or oral statements made 
'"""""""'~'.· .. ·.1:1111111111, by others.'' 
--:' This is well illu.strated in the case at bar by his answers 
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at R. 82 and 83, where on being pressed for a direct an-
swer on where and when he was told by appellant that he 
was a partner with six others he gave the following 
answers: 
Q. "Where were you at when ~fr. Hong told you 
that, Mr. Watson~" A. "Oh! On the southwest corner 
of the building, outside." Q. "What time of day was it~" 
A. "I would venture it was around sometime in the morn-
ing, between 9 :00 and 12 :00 o'clock.'' Q. "Can you make 
that more definite 0/'' A. ''No, I cannot." Q. "It could 
have been any place between 9 :00 and 12 :00 o'clock, is 
that right~" A. "Yes. It has been two years ago." 
The foregoing testimony comes under the class of 
evidence referred to in Footnote No. 53 to Sec. 1031, of 32 
CJS 1071: 
"Evidence of the 'I don't remember' class is 
of doubtful probative force." 
Lastly, the're ·isn't a scintiUa of evidence that the 
unalleged but found partne'rship 1cas unjustly enriched 
by the materials furnished to lJlcDer'lnond and Copa 
Supper Club Va1-t N oy. The building, the fixtures and the 
leasehold was never owned by a partnership nor was 
promoter l\!cDern1ond acting as agent for appellant 
Hong, and the plaintiffs never furnished materials to a 
partnership, never relied upon or acted upon the instance 
of a partnership to their detrin1ent and to a partnership's 
enrichment unjustly obtained. Even if it could be said 
that plaintiffs dealt with a partnership there is no evi-
dence that Copa Supper Club 'Tan Noy "'"as a member of 
the partnership and was acting 'vi thin the scope of part-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
53 
nership authority so a.s to qualify as a partner with au-
thority referred to in the case of Peterson v. Armstrong, 
24 Ut. 96, 66 P 767, in which the court said: 
"A partner, without special authority, has no 
power to bind the con1pany in any transaction out-
side the apparent scope of the partnership busi-
ness, and persons dealing with the paTtnership 
are bound to take notice thereof." 
See also Cavanaugh v. Salisbury, 63 P. 39, 22 Ut. 465; also 
Buthiel v. Gilmer, et al., 23 Ut. 84, 62 P. 817, in which the 
rule was laid down that he who seeks to hold the firm 
liable by virtue of a transaction not U'ithin the real or 
apparent scope of the business of the partnership, he 
deals so at his peril and the burden is up-on him to show 
that the contracting partner had authority to enter into 
the transaction. 
POINT IV 
·THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACT ARE IN-
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION OF LAW 
ENTITLING ·THE PLAINTIFF TO FORECLOSE PLAIN-
TIFFS' LIENS AGAINST THE DEFENDANT, HARRY HONG. 
There isn't a scintilla of evidence th.at plaintiffs had a 
lien against the right, title and lea.sehold interest of ap-
pellant Hong relative to described property. There being 
no Notice of Lien timely recorded, a conclusion of law 
finding that a lien recorded against someone else, which 
has failed, and that the same lien should be foreclosed 
ag.ainst another person not even named in the Notice of 
Liens recorded, just doesn't make good logical sense let 
alone good judicial sense. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURTS ACTIONS OF ELICITING TESTI-
MONY BY RECALLING AND QUESTIONING ADVERSE 
WITNESS TO DEFENDANT, AFTER PLAINTIFFS HAD 
RES'TED, ALLOWING SAID SAME ADVERSE WITNESS 
TO FREELY INTERFERE WITH GENERAL ·CONDUCT OF 
CASE BY ATTORNEYS WAS PREJUDI·CIAL AND ERROR. 
A trial judge's duties are of a judicial nature, he 
should not act as counsel for a party especially after 
said party has rested, by recalling said resting party's 
witnesse.s on his own behalf. The Court: ''Mr. Watson, 
do you want to say something 1" l\Ir. \V .. atson: "Yes." 
The Court: "Just come in here." (R. 88). The Court: 
"Just a minute, Mr. Watson. We will call on yon." (R. 
90) The Court: "·Come in, Mr. \\ .... atson, if you want to 
testify further." (R. 90) The Court: (To witness Wat-
son) "If he can testify you had better bring him in. We 
can't have you testifying for him." The Court: "Is he 
here~'' The Court : "Let n1e see the man.~~ (R. 91) He 
should not allow adverse "itnesses to interrupt c.ounsel 
in the ordinary conduct of a rase: (R. SS, 90) nor should 
he disregard completely and not pass upon objections 
timely made by counsel.against an adverse "~itness (twice 
R. 89); and it is subn1itted he should not make up his 
mind prior to hearing defense counsel present his case as 
could be reasoned fron1 the courts question put to Mr. 
Ashworth: "Do you desire to put 111ore testimony on, 
Mr. Ashworth'" (R. 93), and to !Ir. Conder: "Well, 
there is no use arguing about it. It is Yours if you want 
. . 
.it." (R. 87) 
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In 53 Am. Jur. 75, Sec. 75, it is s.aid: 
"He (the judge) should not usurp the func-
tions of counsel by prescribing the order of call-
ing witnesses or interrupting with the general 
conduct of the case by the attorneys or by exam-
ining witnesses to the exclusion of counsel." 
It is submitted th.at the trial court's conduct of the 
trial after plaintiff had rested (R. 86) by recognizing, 
encouraging and eliciting testimony from witness Watson 
who was not on the stand or even recalled by coun.sel of 
either plaintiffs or defendant, and who could hardly be 
deemed an uninterested witness in view of his antics from 
the audience at the backs of counsel when recognized, by 
the court, is error. This same witness Watson being 
biased for having testified more than once that he had 
to wait for his money, (R. 81, 88, 89) and twice (once 
from the audience) that a man who worked for him still 
had $150.00 coming from the job which he blamed de-
fendant Hong for (R. 81 and 89). Further that as a 
direct result thereof, the witness Kinzer was produced 
who claimed he had money yet coming from the job, and 
thus a biased witness (R. 91) had a perfect clear memory 
of having received a check in the sum of $71.00 from 
appellant Hong, though previously had not apparently 
relayed this information to plaintiffs attorneys. That 
this testimony elicited directly as a result of the court's 
apparent desire hy remarks made in open court in the 
......... presence of said witnesse·s, indicating a wanting to find 
partnership liability upon appellant Hong, said remarks 
being made while passing upon the motion to dismiss 
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made by defendant and owner Glezos, such testimony 
was certainly in the ei)TeS of this trial court of such ma-
terial nature that appellant at the time suffered irrepar. 
able damage. Counsel for appellant, fully cognizant of 
their own short comings, do submit that the actions of 
the trial court in conducting this case was such as would 
unnerve the mo.st experienced of counsel and in view 
of the courts actions in disregarding appellant's objec-
tions when made would make further objections useless 
beyond possibly arousing the ire of the court. 
POINT VI 
THAT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
In an effort to condense and be brief all other objec-
tions and errors complained of are included herein. 
That the judgment was acquired by surprise which 
ordinary prudence on the part of defendant Hong could 
not have guarded against is an understatement and is 
such surprise as is conten1plated by Rule 59 (a) and (e) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for which relief 
should be granted. Nothing in the pleadings or Notice 
of Liens filed indicated that if the recorded lien against 
the owner in fee would fail in being foreclosed, it would , 
be or could be foreclosed against appellant's leasehold 
interest. The same can be said about the finding and con· 
elusion that the materials 'vere furnished to an unalleged 
partnership of which .appellant was a member along with r 
six ot~ers. No one could have, by any stretch of judicial 
logic, anticipated frorn the pleadings prior to trial that 
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plaintiffs "\vould be entitled to a judgment against de-
fendant Charles C. McDermond individually, the Cop.a 
Supper Club, ·valley Amusement Enterprises, Nick 
Glezos individually, appellant individually and against 
an unalleged partnership of six as a result of having 
furnished material at the instance of Nick Glezos. Appel-
lant in the case at bar was absolutely powerless to have 
prep.ared a defense and guarded against the finding of 
partnership liability being imposed upon hin1 from the 
information relied upon in the pleadings. At the trial 
the courts actions of acting as plaintiffs attorney by rec-
ognizing and recalling witness Watson upon its own voli-
tion, eliciting testimony after plaintiffs had rested and 
before reopening the case at bar (R. 86 to 91), completely 
disregarding objection_s made by appellant's counsel time-
ly made (R. 89) was so surprising that even the most 
experienced counsel would have been hard put to have 
guarded against. 
The presence of witness Kinzer at the trial after 
plaintiffs had failed to name or disclose him as a witness 
in answer to interrogatories submitted to them (R. 36, 
37, and 40) and his subsequent testimony elicited by the 
court when interferring with the gener.al conduct of the 
case, that he had been paid by check in the amount of 
$71.00 by appellant Hong was of such a surprising nature 
that it even surprised counsel for the plaintiffs as 'veil, 
as can easily be concluded from the following testimony 
at R. 91: 
The Court : "If he can testify you had better bring 
him in. We can't have you testifying for him." 
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!fr. Watson: "He got the check signed by Harry 
Hong." 
The Court : "Is he here~" 
Mr. Draper: "Come forward." 
The Court: "Let me see the man." 
Mr. Conder: "He was paid a check by a Chinaman, 
Your Honor. He doesn't know whether it was Mr. Hong 
or not." 
Mr. Kinzer: "Yes, it was." 
Mr. Conder: "l\iay we reopen the case, your Honor!" 
The Court: "You may." 
He thereafter testified that "there was some added 
work that I haven't been paid for yet." (R. 91) 
That after said judgment, defendant Hong did dis-
cover that new evidence and material set out in his un-
contradicted affidavit at R. 102 and 103 and such newly 
discovered evidence and material "-hich could not with 
reasonable diligence have been discovered before and 
produced at trial and is such evidence and material as 
contemplated by Rule 59 (a) (-!) of the [~talz Rules of 
Civz~l Procedure. 
That the trial court did by rendering judgment 
against Appellant Hong indiYidually as a partner did 
in effect find that appellant Hong did agree to pay the 
debts of another, "\vithout haYing signed to do so in writ-
ing, to-wit: To pay for each and all the nruned defendants 
in the case at bar except owner Glezos and to pay for an 
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unknown, unnamed and unidentified p.artnership of six. 
This finding although not spelled out directly is in viola-
tion of the Statutes of Fraud and as such is error in law. 
The fact that the Statute of Frauds is an affirmative 
defense should not bar it from being interposed .at this 
time when there are no pleadings to which the defense 
could be affirmatively alleged in answer thereto prior to 
and be£ ore trial. 
CONCLUSION 
]..,or each and all of the aforesaid reasons, appellant 
submits that the judgment of the lower court should be 
reversed, ordering judgment to be entered in favor of 
appellant, Harry Hong and against plaintiffs, dismissing 
plaintiffs cause of action or remanding the same back for 
a new trial and appellant awarded his costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE H. SEARLE 
.and 
WAYNE A. ASH\VORTH, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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